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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
Volume 1:  Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 2 .  Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
1 0 .  The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
12  October 1 9 8 1  
Hugh J. Miser 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
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CHAPTER 2. THE GENESIS OF APPLIED SYSI'EMS ANALYSIS 
Giandomenico Majone 
1. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
An adequate account of a field of inquiry should be capable of explaining its 
continuities as well as its changes-possibly in terms of the same underlymg'pro- 
cess. Considered over a sufficiently long period of time, a discipline like physics 
changes quite radically in its objects of inquiry, its methods, and its aims. Yet, 
despite such changes, the discipline maintains a recognizable continuity; less 
because of a common professional commitment to a central core of principles 
or key questions, than because the problems on whch successive generations of 
physicists have focused their attention are connected by recognizable lines of 
descent. These problems form, to use Toulrnin's expression, a "genealogy" of 
issues and of related concepts and tools.' 
Similarly, the development of applied systems analysis (ASA) over the last 
forty or so years reveals considerable changes in intellectual contents, methods, 
and aims. Tne tactical problems that formed the main objects of inquiry of 
operations research (OR) during World War 2 have been followed by the strategic 
problems investigated by defense analysts in the 1950s and 1960s. Today's pol- 
'Stephen Toulmin Human Vnderstandang, vol. l ,  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1972, pp. 134-144. 
icy analysts focus on social and economic problems: regulation and pollution 
control, energy and education, housing and health care. The accompanying 
changes in methods have been equally striking: from the relatively simple data 
analyses and differential equations of the early military applications to the 
static and dynamic optimization models of contemporary OR, to the 
econometric models of policy analysis. h m s  have also changed. If the goal of 
the first analysts of military operations was essentially empirical-to give a 
scientific explanation of the facts, and to make successful predictions of the 
effectiveness of new weapons and new tactics, that of the systems and policy 
analysts is primarily prescriptive-to assist the decisionmaker in choos~ng 
among alternative courses of action. And we are now beginning to recognize a 
third legitimate function or aim for ASA, as a vehicle of persuasion and argu- 
mentation in the policy debate. 
The question immediately facing the historian of ASA is whether an underly- 
ing continuity can be detected below these changes in problems, methods, and 
disciplinary aims. Or should one rather speak of mutations that have altered in 
fundamental ways the original enterprise? A good argument could be made in 
favor of the mutation hypothesis; yet the weight of the evidence favors the 
hypothesis of continuity, as I shall try to show. The difficulties of the proof 
should not be underestimated, however. In mature disciplines like physics or 
mathematics, essential continuity is maintained by the joint operation.of a dual 
process of intellectual innovation and critical evaluation and selection. The pool 
of available theories and methods is continually enriched by intellectual novel- 
ties, but only a few of the novelties survive the severe tests to which they are 
exposed. In this way disciplinary identity can be maintained over considerable 
periods of time. But in order for t h s  dual process of innovation and selection to 
work satisfactorily, there must be professional "forums of competition" (Toul- 
min) w i t h  which new ideas can survive long enough to show their merits and 
defects, but in whch they are also criticized and eliminated with enough sever- 
ity to maintain the coherence of the discipline.' 
By contrast, ASA is still a maturing field in which the rate of intellectual 
innovation is much greater than the rate of critical selection. Hence a prolifera- 
tion of approaches and "schools" that seem to have little in common. And 
because of the fragility of the existing mechanisms of quality control, the sur- 
vival or rejection of intellectual novelties seems to depend more on academic 
fashon and external support than on a sober assessment of their 
potentialities-as shown by the examples of game theory, value theory, or pro- 
gram budgeting. 
The example of program budgeting suggests another important reason why 
the evolutionary model of "conjectures and refutations" is so much more com- 
plex in the case of ASA than in the traditional academic disciplines. ASA is a 
form (indeed, the main form) of articulate intervention into ongoing action pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~  This means that the conceptual innovations proposed by systems 
analysts will be evaluated not only by the canons of disciplinary criticism, but 
also according to criteria of social effectiveness. New proposals must fit into a 
certain intellectual tradition or research program (like all conceptual novelties), 
must also be adapted to, and adopted by, an ongoing social process or action 
program (a  problem which theoretical innovations do not have to face). Depend- 
ing on time and circumstances, one or the other criterion-professional quality 
or social effectiveness-may prevail; but in the long run, it is doubtful that an 
analytic proposal can survive without meeting some minimal standards of ade- 
quacy along both dimensions. 
I have already referred to Toulmin's "genealogy of problems" as the ele- 
ment by which a field of intellectual inquiry preserves its &sciplinary identity. 
W e  can see now that in the case of ASA we should rather speak of a lattice of des- 
cendant p r ~ b l e r n s , ~  to signify the fact that the problems of systems analysis do 
%tephen Toulmin, hmun [mdmstanding, cit., ch. 1. 
9Hylton Boothroyd, ArticuLuts Intorvention, London: Taylor and Francis, 1878. See also, Gian- 
domenico Majone, "Policies as Theories," Omega, vol. 8, no. 2, pp.151-162. 
'I borrow this expression from J.R. Ravetz; see his Scientific K n o d s d g e  a n d  i f s  Social h& 
lems, Harmondsrrorth, England; Penguin Books, 1973, especially pp.181- 198. 
not develop along disciplinary (or even interdisciplinary) lines only, but inevit- 
ably mix with problems derived from political, social, and institutional sources. 
In our reconstruction we shall also have to bear constantly in mind that,like 
any other historically developing intellectual enterprise, ASA has two aspects. 
We can think of it as a (composite) discipline comprising, at  any given point in 
time, a stock of theories, conceptual frameworks, and techniques for d e a h g  
with theoretical and practical problems; or we can view it as a profession 
comprising a set of institutions, roles, and people whose business it is to apply 
and improve these methods and t e c h q u e s .  Hence our account of the evolution 
of ASA falls into two parts, one dealing with disciplinary developments (Sections 
2-4), the other with institutional and professional developments (Sections 5 and 
6). Each part, by itself, gives an inadequate and distorted view of the field. A 
purely intellectual history of methodological developments cannot explain, for 
example, why OR developed along quite different lines, after the War, in the 
United States and in Britain or Canada (or why, for that matter, industrial 
engineering had not developed into something like operations research already 
in the 1930s). On the other hand, a study of professional organizations, roles (in 
industry, government, and the universities), and institutional mechanisms of 
evaluation and control (journals, conferences, policy research institutes) has 
more than sociological interest only if it is related to the historically developing 
cognitive basis of ASA. 
2. FROM OPERATIONS RESEARCH TO SYSlTNS ANALYSIS 
P.M. S. Blackett, the Nobel-prize-winning British physicist who was a leader 
of the early OR work, wrote two short but influential memoranda toward the end 
of 1941: "Scientists at  the Operational Level" (written in order to inform the 
Admiralty of developments that had taken place in the Operational Research 
Sections already established at different Commands of the Royal Air Force), and 
"A Note on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of Operational Research" ("an 
attempt to set out, for the benefit of new scientific recruits to the operational 
research sections, some of the principles that had been found to underlie the 
work of the first two years of the war"'). Together with another paper written by 
the same author a few years after the end of the W a r ,  "The Scope of Operational 
R e ~ e a r c h , " ~  these notes represent not only some of the earliest, but also some of 
the clearest and most insightful discussions of the principles of OR as practiced 
during the 1940s. 
The first step in the establishment of a sphere of professional autonomy is a 
claim to "cognitive exclusiveness" over some portion of reality.? Consequently, 
Blackett takes great pains to dif'ferentiate the functions of the operations 
analysts from those of their closest potential competitors, technical services on 
the one hand, and operational staffs, on the other: 
The object of having scientists in close touch with operations is to 
enable operational staffs to obtain scientific advice on those matters 
whch are not handled by the service techmcal establishments. 
Operational staffs provide the scientists with the operational 
outlook and data. The scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to 
these data, and are thus able to give useful advice. 
The main field of their activity is clearly the analysis of actual 
operations, using as data the material to be found in an operation 
room... 
It will be noted that these data are not, and on secrecy grounds 
cannot, in general, be made available to the technical establishments. 
Thus scientific analysis if done at  all, must be done in or near opera- 
tion r o o r n ~ . ~  
For example, weapon A is calculated by the technical dep~.rtment of a ser- 
vice to be 50 percent more efficient than weapon B. In actual operations, over a 
?he two memoranda, the second one reproduced in a text dated from May 1643, can now be 
found in P.M.S. Blackett, Studios of W a r ,  New York: Hill and Wang, 1962, pp.16&188. 
60pemtional Research Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, 1950; now in Studies of War, cit., pp. 18*204. 
aali Sarfatti Larson, l?w Rise of hfessional ism,  Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1977. 
given period of time, B scores 4 successes, while A scores only 2. Is this suffi- 
cient evidence to reject the estimates of the technical department and proceed 
as if B were the better weapon? Here the role of the operations analyst 1s simi- 
lar to that of the statistician facing a standard problem in statistical inference. 
His task is to try to reject the null hypothesis-represented by the estimates of 
the technical department. 
As another typical example of operations analysis, Blackett considers the 
problem of discovering the best use, under actual operating conditions, of a new 
device. Operations researchers can perform a useful function here by interpret- 
ing the "operational facts of life" to technical people, and technical possibilities 
to the operational staff; i.e., by operating in a liaison capacity between the 
operational staff, the technical department that produced the device, and the 
development unit. 
Particularly in times of war, the demand for new weapons and technical 
gadgets tends to become overwhelming. But, Blackett points out, relatively too 
much scientific effort is expended in the production of new devices and too little 
in the proper use of what is already available. Hence, another important task of 
operations research consists in providmg numerical estunates of the value of 
changing over from one device to another, by investigation of the actual perfor- 
mance of existing systems, and by analysis of the llkely performance of new 
ones. Incidentally, it will be noted how clearly Blackett prefigures here the 
future development of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis which was to 
play such a large role in systems analysis in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Having established a sphere of autonomy for a problem-solvmg approach 
that is neither purely technical, nor exclusively operational, but partakes of 
both functions, Blackett goes on to raise three methodological questions about 
OR: Is it scientific? Is it new? If so, in what ways? 
Now, if one accepts the usual characterization of operations research as the 
application of the scientific method to the study of operations, then the answer 
BP.M.~ .  Blackett, op. cit., p. 171. 
to the first question must be "yesu-by definition. The trouble with this charac- 
terization is that there is no unique "scientific method," least of all in the sense 
of a set of mechanical rules that would allow one to move safely from data to 
conclusions. It is true that the pioneers of operations research, men like P.M.S. 
Blackett, C.H. Waddington, P.M. Morse, G.E. Kirnball, and B.O. Koopman were 
scientists-physicists, biologists, and mathematicians of h g h  caliber. But what 
they brought to the new field was not a particular "method," or even advanced 
scientific knowledge, but a new perspective and a set of superb craft skills in 
examining the available evidence , considering what conclusions could be drawn 
from it, and deciding what other information was required, and how it could be 
obtained.' 
This distinction is important because the view of science as craftsman's 
work (and it is precisely in this sense that operations research or ASA may be 
considered scientific, as I have argued at some length elsewhere1') leads to quite 
different methodological positions from those suggested by a vulgar-positivistic 
view of science. A dogmatic interpretation of the nature of scientific method 
can easily lead to an attitude which John Tukey has recently expressed in the 
epigram: "We don't want to try to measure anything where we cannot be proud 
of the measurement process."" The craftsman, on the other hand, tries to do 
his best with the materials and tools at  his disposal-always keeping in mind 
Aristotle's dictum that "precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussion, 
any more than in all the products of the crafts ... ." See, for example, what 
Blackett has to say about the use of rough data in operations research: 
No pregnant problem should be left unattended for lack of ezact  
numerical data, for often it is found on doing the analysis that sonre 
@There is an interestmg analogy with the take-over in the late 1840s of theoretical biology by 
men originally trained in physics. The development of molecular biology is  essentially due to  these 
"emigre physicists," but as Szilard has emphasized, what these men brought to biology was "not any 
skills acquired in physics, but rather an attitude: the conviction which few biologists had at the time, 
that mysteries can be solved"; see S. Toulmin, Humn Vndorstunding, cit., p.234. 
'%iandomenico Majone, Tho &aft of Applied Systoms Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria: M A ,  
1980. 
"John W. Tukey, "Methodology, and the ~tati&cian's Responsibility for BOTH Accuracy AND 
Relevance," Journd of tho American Stat is t icai  Association, vol. 74, no. 368, December 1878, 
pp.786-789, 786. 
significant conclusions recommending concrete action can be drawn 
even with very rough data. In other cases this is, of course, not so. But 
tdl the problem is worked out, one cannot tell. 
It often happens that when the problem has been worked through 
in a very rough form, it is found that data which were thought to be 
important are actually unimportant, and vice versa. .. . It must always 
be remembered that the object of the analysis is practical-that is, 
that it should lead to action. Attempts a t  undue and unnecessary pre- 
cision are to be avoided.12 
Inci'dentally, the problem of maklng effective use of rough data is still very 
much with the policy analyst of today, as shown for example by Frederick 
Mosteller's insightful paper "Assessing Unknown Numbers: Order of Magnitude 
~s t imat ion .  " lS 
Concerning the second and t k d  questions, Blackett argues that operations 
research has a considerable degree of novelty, but t h s  relative novelty lies "not 
so much in the material to which the scientific method is applied as in the level 
a t  which work is done, in the comparative freedom of the investigators to seek 
out their own problems, and in the direct relation of the work to the possibilities 
of executive action." l4 
Of these three distinctive features of original OR work, the second one-the 
comparative freedom of the invesbgators to seek out their own problems-seems 
to be the most important. "In fact," Blackett adds, "the most fertile tasks are 
often found by the [operations research] group themselves rather than giSen to 
them. That t b s  is so is only to be expected, since any problem which is clearly 
recognized by the executives is likely, in an efficient organization, to be already 
a matter of study." 
"P.M.s. Blackett, "Operational Research," cit., p.185. 
i31n Sfufistics m d  Public Pblicy, W.B. Fairley and F. Mosteller, editors, Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1877, pp. 189184. 
i4P.M.S. Blackett, "Operational Research," cit., p.201. 
But ii this is so, it is wrong to argue, as A.M. Mood does, that industrial 
engineers, quality control experts, time-and-motion experts, investment coun- 
selors, product packagers, and personnel managers (!) have been dolng opera- 
tions research in industry "for at  least a couple of generations."" 
In fact, it seems very doubtful that any of these alleged precursors of OR 
would meet all the three criteria set down by Blackett. Before the large-scale 
introduction of operations research methods, most analyses of industrial opera- 
tions were largely empirical in character. Certainly, they were not carried out 
in that atmosphere of a "first-class pure scientific research institution" which, 
according to Blackett, is necessary to the effectiveness of an OR team. And it is 
also doubtful that the early analysts of industrial operations had the freedom to 
seek out their own problems, being usually constrained by the specific research 
tasks assigned to them by management. As already noted, social and institu- 
tional factors were probably responsible for the fact that industrial engineering 
and "scientific management" did not actually evolve into genuine OR work, as 
the term is understood today-despite some remarkable initial successes and 
the efforts of people like Frederick Taylor and his favorite disciple, Morris 
Cooke, to pull the industrial engineer "out of his present status of being a hlred 
servant ."I6 
Space does not permit going into the details of Blackett's memorandum on 
the methodology of operations research. I should like, however, to mention 
briefly two notions that, introduced here for the first time into the OR literature, 
were to become standard approaches in the subsequent development of systems 
analysis. My main reason for mentioning them is to point out an interestmg 
strand of continuity in the evolution of ASA. Under the name of "variational 
method," Blackett introduced a type of analysis closely analogous to the 
9 e e  his critical review of Morse and Kimball's Mathods of Opwotim Research in Journal of 
tho Opemtions Rosearch Society  of Amm-ica, vol. 1, no. 5, November 1853, pp.308-308. Probhbly in 
response to this criticism, Morse too began to see precursors of OR everywhere: "[Tlhough the term 
is new, t h s  sort of research is not new, of course. Taylor and his followers, with their time and m e  
tion studies, investigated a small part of the field; traffic engineers have been strugghg with another 
part; systems engineering is closely related, and so on." Cf. Philip M. Morse, "Statistics and Opera- 
tions Research;" Opotufiolrs Resoarch, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1856, pp.2-19, 5. 
'Quoted by Mad Sarfatti Larson, ho Rise of Prof & o n d i n ,  cit., p. 140. 
economist's marginal reasoning. According to the variational method, each new 
tactical situation is to be treated as a variation of some old one-about whlch 
some data are always available. The problem is to find out how a given system 
would be altered if some of the variables that determine its effectiveness were 
varied. The practical applicability of the method depends on the fact that 
technical devices cannot change very rapidly because of the time required by 
development and production; even tactical operations do not usually change 
very fast, if for no other reason than the necessary duration of training. Thus, 
even if a new system B is not very similar to the old system A (so that the dif- 
ferentials of the input variables dX1 , dX2 , . . . by wbch the effectiveness of B 
can be derived from that of A, are not very small) the results may be fairly reli- 
able, "provided common sense and judgment are used."17 
A second interesting idea discussed in the memorandum is a method for 
comparing alternative systems under uncertainty that later came to be known 
as "a fortimi analysis." Sometimes lower or upper bounds on the possible effec- 
tiveness of. a system are known more accurately than the actual values. Thus, to 
compare a new system B with an existing system A whose effectiveness YA is 
known, assume upper limits (i.e., most favorable to B) for the relevant input 
variables. Let Y; be the estimated upper bound on the effectiveness of B. If 
Y; < YA, then system B is certainly inferior (if Y; > YA no meaningtill conclusion 
can be derived without more calculations). Assuming a lower bound Y; (most 
unfavorable case for B), if Y; > YA, B is certainly superior. Some fifteen years 
after Blackett's orlginal memorandum, two well-known analysts from the Rand 
Corporation were to write that "[mlore than any other single thing, the skilled 
"P.M.s. Blackett, "Operational Research," cit., pp. 18Ck182. In more modem language, Blackett 
is assumin that the effectiveness or yield of a system, denoted by Y, is determined by n inputs 
XI,. . ,fn : Y =  F(X1.X?, . . . .Xn). dY/dX, is then the marginal product of Xi. If the 
marginal products can be estimated (and Blackett discusses some statistical and analyt~c methods 
for estimating them), then the operational effect of changes in input variables (weapons, tactics, 
training, etc.) can be estimated by m e w  of the total differential: 
where Y' is the effectiveness af the new system. The interested reader should compare Blackett's 
original memorandum with Alain C. Enthoven's "The Simple Mathematics of Optimization," published 
as an appendix to Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, hs Economics 01 Dulense in tho Nurlsur 
Age, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1867, pp.581-405. 
use of a fortiori and break-even analyses separates the professionals from the 
a rna te~rs . " '~  
Thus, before the end of World War 2, operations researchers had already 
developed a number of concepts and approaches whose usefulness would be fully 
revealed in subsequent decades. However, it is worth pointlng out again that, 
with the notable exception of search theory developed by B.O. Koopman and 
others in the US Navy's Operations Research Group, successful wartime applica- 
tions of operations research were not based on new theories or advanced techni- 
cal tools, but on a sophisticated use of craft skdls, learned in the scientific 
laboratories, in recording, analyzing, and evaluating data, in establishmg quanti- 
tative relationshps, and in setting up testable hypotheses. The first textbook on 
operations research, Philip M. Morse and George E. Kirnball's Methods  of @era- 
tions ~ e s e u ~ c h , ' ~  contains no more advanced mathematics than multiple 
integration, differential equations, and continuous probabilities. 
The mathematical and statistical theories that form the technical core of 
OR today-queuing theory, mathematical programming, inventory theory, net- 
work flows, applied stochastic processes, control theory-were developed (and 
sometimes rediscovered) after the War, with the introduction of OR into industry 
and as a subject for teachmg and research in universities. An excellent example 
of OR as practiced in the early 1950s is Leslie C. Edie's "Traffic Delays at Toll 
~ 0 0 t h ~ " ~ ~ - f i r s t  winner of the Lanchester Prize awarded annually for a book or 
paper making a significant contribution to the advancement of the state of the 
art of OR. 
Probably the most sqnificant methodological development of the first 
decade after the War was the creation of a set of efficient techniques for pro- 
gramming several activities sharing Lmited resources. The general problem is 
lBHerman Kahn and Irwin Mann, Techniques of Systems Analysis, Santa Monica, California: The 
Rand Corporation, RM-1820, December 1056. 
'Wiley, New York, 1951. The volume was first published in 1946, as a classified technical report, 
under the auspices of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development and the National Defense 
Research Committee. 
qublished in the J o u r n d  of tho O p d i o n s  Research Society of A m m a ,  vol. 2, no. 2, May 
1854, pp. 107-138. 
to determine the level of each activity that optimizes the output of all activities 
without violating the given resource constraints. There are several reasons for 
the practical and conceptual significance of this development, especially the 
linear programming models developed by George B. Dantzig and other research- 
ers. First, the mathematical problem of maximizing an objective function sub- 
ject to various constraints covers a very wide range of situations occurring in 
production and inventory control, in military planning, in agriculture, transpor- - 
tation, financial management, and so on. In the important special case of a 
linear (or piecewise linear) objective function and linear constraints, the solu- 
tion algorithm (simplex) developed by Dantzig can be implemented efficiently 
with the help of a d~gital computer, thus allowing the explicit solution of quite 
large programming problems. Second, the programming viewpoint opened up a 
number of important connections with economic theory-particularly with the 
neoclassical theory of production and the "new welfare economics." In this 
respect, great economic significance attaches to the fact that a direct by- 
product of the solution of a mathematical programming problem is a set of sha- 
dow prices, or Lagrange multipliers, representing the effects on the objective 
function of marginal changes in one or more constraints. Finally, the b e a r  pro- 
gramming approach turned out to be signiiicantly, and often surprisingly, 
related to other methods of importance for operations research, such as game 
theory, input-output analysis, and network flow theory. These different connec- 
tions are discussed at great length in two landmark publications of this period: 
Activity Analysis of Aoduction and AUocation, edited b y  Tjalllng C. ~ o o p r n a n s , ~ ~  
and Linear Programming and Economic Analysis, by Robert Dorfman, Paul A. 
Samuelson, and Robert ~ o l o w . ~ ~  
As these developments (and others in inventory theory, waiting-time and 
replacement models, and applied stochastic processes whch cannot be &s- 
cussed here) suggest, important changes were taking place between 1945 and 
1955, in personnel, disciplinary aims, and, consequently, also in the implicit 
elNew York: Wiley, 1851. 
q e w  York McGraw-Hill, 1958. 
standards of evaluation and criticism. While people like Blackett, Waddmgton, 
and Morse were returning to their laboratories and university departments, a 
new generation of analysts was entering the OR scene-people primarily 
interested in the more formal aspects of scientific methodology and proficient 
in mathematical manipulations, but often lacking the craft slulls and the mature 
critical judgment of the old masters. The goal, of operations research, as the 
early practitioners saw it, was "to find a scientific explanation of the facts."23 
The phases of investigation followed the pattern prevalent in the science labora- 
tory: "...past operations are studied to determine the facts; theories are ela- 
borated to explain the facts; and finally the facts and theories are used to make 
predictions about future operations ... "24 
Given thls paradigm, the relevant standards of criticism were those of 
natural science. In fact, the situations investigated by operations researchers 
during the War were particularly well suited to such an approach. Typically, mil- 
itary operations could be regarded, without serious distortions, as being 
representative of a class of repetitive situations "where theories built up in 
response to earlier examples of the situation could be checked out against later 
examples, monitored while proposals for improved action were in use, and used 
to detect their own dwindling validity as the situations changed."'' Works like 
Edie's "Traffic Delays at Toll Booths," and C.W. Thornthwaite's "Operations 
Research in ~ ~ r i c u l t u r e , " ~ ~  still followed the classical pattern, and explicitly 
appealed to the established criteria of validation. 
But by 1955 the focus of professional interests had clearly shifted away 
from military operations, while the scope and methods of OR work had changed 
sufficiently to raise serious questions about the relevance of the traditional 
standards of evaluation and criticism' to contemporary professional practice. 
The increasing popularity of computer-based models (with the attendant serious 
8C.H. Waddmgton, OR in World War 2, London: ELEK Science Ltd., 1973, p.26. 
erP.M.S. Blackett, "Operational Research," cit., p.177. 
=Hylton Boothroyd, M c u l u f o  Intorvmfion, c i t ,  p.113. 
2sPublished in the Journat o j  tho Opemfions Research Society o j  America, vol. 1, no. 2, Febru- 
ary 1053, pp.3538. 
problems of validation) made the need for new criteria of criticism even more 
obvious. A consecutive reading of the recommendations of the Lanchester Prize 
Committee, starting with the first report in 1954, gives a good indication of the 
difficulties experienced by the profession in findlng agreement on a set of 
relevant criteria of evaluation. 
Let us return to the changes in the disciplinary composition of operations 
research. In the early stages of development, the part played by the economists 
in OR activities had been quite modest, compared to that of the natural scien- 
tists and the mathematicians. With the expansion of the scope of operations 
research in the post-War years, particularly in the United States, to include mih- 
tary strategy as well as a growing number of public policy problems in health, 
education, transportation, housing, and the social services, the role of the 
economist was bound to become increasingly important-as shown by the elec- 
tion of Rand economist Charles J. Hitch to the presidency of the Operations 
Research Society of America in 1959. As a group, economists have made two 
basic contributions to the development of the field: first, a penetrating critique 
of certain conceptual inadequacies (e.g., in the selection of criteria and in the 
treatment of time) of early OR applications; second, the proposal of an intellec- 
tual framework derived from decision theory and the microeconomic logic of 
choice as the most appropriate paradigm for operations research. 
A good example of the new critical attitude is Hitch's paper on "Sub- 
optimization in Operations ~roblems."~ '  The validity and usefulness of operations 
research, Hitch argues, depends to a large extent on the ability to choose the 
correct criterion or objective function for the problem under discussion. 
"Unless operations research develops methods of evaluating criteria and choos- 
ing good ones, its quantitative methods may prove worse than useless to its 
clients in its new applications in government and industry."28 The main criterion 
for judging whether the objective function chosen for a given level of analysis is 
qublished in the Journal of tho Operations kssearch Society of Amorica, vol. 1, no. 3, Pay 
3 853, pp. 87-99. 
-bid., p.87. 
the correct one is consistency with the relevant objective function at a higher 
level. Unfortunately, too many OR studies in the past have failed to meet this 
criterion. For example, in devising a suitable strategy for the defense of naval 
convoys against attacks by enemy submarines, one should keep in mind that the 
relevant hlgher level objective is winning the war. The criterion of effectiveness 
chosen at  the operational level should be consistent with it. But the criterion 
actually used during the War-whch amounted to maximizing the "exchange 
ratio" of enemy losses to one's own losses -is not necessarily compatible with the 
U h e r  level goal. As  a matter of fact, the decision to increase the size of the 
convoys so as to improve the exchange ratio disregarded a number of factors 
(congestion of port facilities, reduced operating efficiency of ships in large con- 
voys, longer turnaround times, redirection of enemy effort) which were obvi- 
ously important for the general strategy of the War 
The examples of improper suboptimization given by Hitch are mostly of a 
military nature, but the phenomenon is quite general. Thus, the sales depart- 
ment of a profit-maximizing firm is not supposed to suboptimize, e.g., to maxim- 
ize the sales minus selling costs, but to choose actions that maximize total pro- 
fits of the firm. Similarly, the correct goal of the production department (in 
terms of the profit targets of the entire organization) is not, in general, the 
minimization of cost per unit of output, nor the maximization of productivity per 
rnan/hour but, again, a mode of operation that is conducive to the maximization 
of total profits.29 
Similar criticisms have been voiced by other economists in different con- 
texts. Martin Feldstein, for example, writes that "[qluantitative methods in 
government management decisions can be extremely fruitful, but in the absence 
of an appropriate framework they can be empty algorithms which hide mislead- 
ing advice in a mass of reassuring calculations He then goes on to argue that 
%at came to be known in the literature as "the criterion problem" is discussed at great 
length in two early classics of systems analysis: Roland N. McKean's Qficiency in Governmenf 
3trrougA Sysfems M y s i s ,  New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1058, and Charles J. Hitch and Re 
land N. McKean's 7Tw Economics of Defense in tho Nuclear Age, cit. 
=Martin S. Feldstein, "Economic Analysis, Opertitiopal Research, and the National Health Ser- 
vice," Q f d  Economic Papers, March 1963, pp.19-31, 21. 
operations research achieves maximum usefulness only if it is considered in a 
framework of economic analysis of the appropriate benefits and costs of alterna- 
hve actions. Feldstein draws lus examples from the experience of the British 
National Health Service. He shows that it is a mistake to approach health- 
service decisions as problems of meeting specific community "needs." Rather, 
they should be approached as problems of allocating scarce health resources 
among competing uses. For example, operations researchers have made ela- 
borate calculations of the number of hospital beds needed to meet doctors' 
requests in a given region, without raislng problng questions about the optimal 
number of beds, where the benefits of hospitalization and longer stay are 
weighed against alternative uses of scarce health resources. 
In part, these criticisms reflect the traditional opposition between the 
economic viewpoint, which is concerned with finding the best allocation of given 
resources among competing ends, and the technical viewpoint, wlych is con- 
cerned with finding the best way of using given resources to aclueve a single 
end. But in a deeper sense what is at issue here is the appropriate conceptuali- 
zation of the system under investigation. The economist's recommendation for 
avoiding the pitfalls of suboptimization is the "golden rule" of allocative effi- 
ciency: scarce resources having alternative uses should be allocated so as to 
make each resource equally scarce (i.e., equally valuable at  the margin) in all 
uses. But allocative efficiency can be achieved only if resources can be freely 
combined and substituted for each other according to their relative prices or 
scarcities-fewer hospital beds and more outpatient services, less air support 
and more ground forces. In this logic, the internal organization of the system is 
irrelevant if not positively misleading, since it tempts the analyst to make the 
scope of the analysis coincide with the boundaries of administrative units and 
decision-making authority. 
Thus it is only a slight overstatement t o  say that the Mference between the 
traditional operations researcher and the economist-turned-systems-analyst is 
that the traditional operations researcher first establishes what the system to 
be studied is, and then inquires about the problems of that system, while the 
systems analyst first determines what the real problem is, and only then 
inquires about the appropriate system or systems withn which t h s  problem 
must be considered if it is to be solved frui t f~l ly .~ '  The emphasis on "system 
design" (as opposed to the static analysis of given alternatives), characteristic of 
so much early writing on systems analysis, fits quite naturally the new decision- 
making paradgm, although, paradoxically, it implicitly reintroduces many of 
the institutional and political factors whose influence the microeconomic para- 
dgm of allocative efficiency had attempted to minimize. As we shall see, policy 
analysis emerged in the late 1960s as an attempt to reconcile the opposing log- 
ics of "economic rationality" and "political rationalityo-broadly understood. But 
in the period we are considering now (from the early 1950s to mid-1960s) the 
success of the economic paradigm in transforming early-vintage operations 
research into a more ambitious and intellectually, if hot technically, more 
sophisticated~systems analysis is almost complete. Cost-effectiveness analysis, 
modeling, optimal timing of projects, gaming, grand strategy: everytbmg seems 
to fall into its proper conceptual place now. 
It is true that microeconomic logic does not deal adequately with decision- 
making under uncertainty. But economists were quick to close the gap by 
appropriating decision theory-an approach to the problem of choice under 
uncertainty originally developed by probabilists, but so general in scope that it 
could claim, with some justification, to include operations research as well as 
wide areas of economics and statistics. Thus, the new paradigm seemed to have 
an answer for all problems of choice, a t  least in principle.'' Systems analysis 
came to be widely regarded as a decision technology, concerned not with how 
systems behave, but how they should behave. A prescriptive approach to 
decisionmaking was the new symbol of rationality, in industry and in govern- 
ment, displacing the earlier emphasis on pre&ction and the "scientific 
31Malcolm W. Hoag, "What is a System?", O p m a f i o n s  Research, vol. 5, no. 3, June 1857, pp.445 
447. - .  
%ee, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, "Decision Theory and Operations Research," Opemtions 
Resewch, vol. 5, no. 6, December 1057, pp.785774. 
explanation of the facts ." 
3. FXOM SYSITMS ANALYSIS TO POLICY ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is simply a method of setting out the factors 
that have to be taken into account in malnng economic choices, particularly in 
the case of investment projects, for the purpose of maximizing the present value 
of all benefits minus that of all costs, subject to given constraints. 'lhs tech- 
nique of economic calculation had been given special attention in one of the 
early and most influential discussions of systems analysis, McKean's EJficiency 
m Government Through S y s t e m  Analysis (1958), which was primarily con- 
cerned with water resources development. Perhaps for t h s  reason, CBA became 
almost identified with systems analysis in the mind of many people, profession- 
als as well as laymen-despite the warning by two well-known economists that 
CBA is "only a technique for taklng decisions withm a framework which has to be 
decided upon in advance and which involves a wide range of considerations, 
many of them of a political or social c h a r a ~ t e r . " ~ ~  Although the claim made by 
some advocates that CBA is "a natural and logical extension" of systems 
analysis and operations research, seems in retrospect rather exaggerated, there 
is some truth in the statement that it is "more ambitious than them in evalua- 
tive scope and in t e c h q ~ e . " ~ ~  Hence by examining, however briefly, the under- 
lying purpose of CBA and the type of relation between analyst and decision- 
maker that it implies, we can gain a better understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the economist's approach, and its significance for the develop- 
ment of systems analy~is .~ '  
Since CBA is used in relation to a decision problem-how to choose between 
two or more alternative courses of action or "social statesv--it assumes a well- 
=A.R. Res t  and R. Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey," B a o m i c  Joumul, vol. 75, 1865, 
pp. 683-735, 685. 
%Alan Williams, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: Bastard Science? And/or Lnsidious Poison in the Body 
Politick?" Journal oJ Public Economics, vol. 1, no. 2, August 1972, pp.109226, 200. 
=For a more complete treatment the reader is  referred to l h a  f%nciplos oJ &acticd Cost- 
B m f i t  AIULL~S~S by Robert Sugden and Alan Williams, Oxford, England: Orford University Press, 1078. 
The last chapter is particularly relevant to the present discussion 
defined decisionmaker or group of decisionmakers. And since it is typically, 
though not exclusively, applied to public decisions involving the welfare of the 
community as a whole, the decisionmaker is supposed to act on behalf of the 
public interest. Leaving analytic technicalities aside (choice of a discount rate, 
treatment of uncertainty, estimation of consumers' and producers' surplus, dis- 
tributional weights, and so on), the distinguishng features of CBA are explicit- 
ness and consistency. CBA is explicit in the sense that, in principle, all assump- 
tions are clearly stated, evidence is presented, calculations and conclusions are 
reproducible. It is explicit also in the sense that it must state clearly not only 
the decisionmaker's objective function, but also the alternatives that have been 
examined and the constraints that have been used. In short, the analyst 
attempts to translate into a well-defined decision problem what was initially, in 
many cases, only a problem situation-a feelmg that things are not as they 
should be, but without a clear idea of how they might be put right. 
The second feature, consistency, is of crucial importance not only for CBA 
but for the entire prescriptive, or normative, approach to the analysis of deci- 
sions. We have already met the problem in our discussion of suboptimization: 
how does one make sure that Lower-level decisions are consistent with Q h e r -  
level ones? The answer given there-the "golden rule" of allocative 
efficiency-presupposed a centralized and fully-informed decisionmaker, capa- 
ble of estimating the marginal utilities of the available resources in all their pos- 
sible uses. Similarly, the utility-maximization rule of decision theory is a way of 
making sure that the decisionmaker's choice (under uncertainty) is consistent 
with h s  subjective estimates of the probability of different contingencies and 
with the utilities he attaches to various conditional outcomes. These meanings 
of consistency are all relevant to the practice of CBA, but in addition to the effi- 
ciency and logical aspects there is a political and ethical problem that no seri- 
ous analyst can evade. To quote Sugden and ~i l l ia rns :~ '  
Ssho AbrcipLos o j  Pructical tbst- Benefit Analysis, cit., pp.233-234. Footnote omitted. 
If decisionmakers were able to specify a different set of objectives 
for each decision that they had to make, cost-benefit analysis would 
be, as opponents of the decision-making approach have alleged, little 
more than window-dressing. To ensure that a pet project received the 
sanction of cost-benefit analysis, a decisionmaker would need only to 
revise h ~ s  objectives in the appropriate way. If the analyst is to escape 
the charge of window-dressmg he must be prepared, in the report that 
he makes of his analysis, to discuss the wider implications of the objec- 
tives that he has used. If, for example, he has been asked to use in a 
cost-benefit analysis of a particular medical treatment a valuation of 
the prolonging of life that is clearly inconsistent with current policy 
towards medical care in general, he ought to make this inconsistency 
clear when he reports. Otherwise the result of his work may be to 
mislead more than to enlighten. 
Thus the analyst should practice explicitness and preach consistency. This 
is a reasonable prescription if we assume a unique decisionmaker, or a group 
whose members share common objectives and disagree only about questions of 
fact. But, the political scientist objects, this is not at all the situation prevailing 
in public policy making. Health, education, or housing policies are not the out- 
comes of the choices of a unitary decision-making body, however powerful, but 
of political processes involv~ng different interest groups, a variety of political 
and bureaucratic institutions, pressure groups, and, in our technological 
society, the analysts themselves. 
The normative approach breaks down, our critic continues, because it rests 
on the fiction of a "benevolent dictator" with complete information about the 
preferences and interests of all members of the community, with no preferences 
of b s  own, and capable of implementing fully his decisions. Not surprisingly, in 
the microeconomic paradigm politics and human nature belong to the institu- 
tional or behavioral givens and are taken to lie outside the scope of analysis. In 
fact, normative analysis, be~ng a generalized logic of choice, terminates at the 
moment a decision is taken, leaving outside questions of policy implementation, 
evaluation, and termination (as distinct from model evaluation and implementa- 
tion). 
Ironically, the political scientist's critique of the economist's approach to 
systems analysis is, in a sense, quite similar to the critical stance taken by 
economists, a decade earlier, with respect to operations research. Both criti- 
cisms revolve around the notion of suboptimization-in one case with respect to 
economic rationality, in the other, with respect to political rationality. The 
difference is that, while the notion of economic rationality can be explicated 
precisely in terms of economic efficiency (either in the general Paretian sense, 
or in the more special sense of allocative efficiency), no generally accepted 
explication of "political rationality" seems to exist. Consequently, attempts to 
differentiate policy analysis from systems analysis have moved along different 
lines. We can distinguish two main directions. Accordmg to one school of 
thought, policy analysis is systems analysis writ large-in the sense that it 
includes, in addition to the technical and economic aspects of a policy problem, 
also those political aspects which systems analysis is supposed to have over- 
looked (whether or to what extent the charge is correct, is an empirical question 
that cannot be discussed here). Yehezkel Dror's manifesto is typical of this 
position. In policy analysis: 
1) Much attention would be paid to the political aspects of 
decisionmakmg and public policy making (instead of ignorlng or con- 
descendingly disregardmg political aspects). .. 
2) A broad conception of decisionmaking and policy making 
would be involved (instead of viewing all decisionmaking as mainly a 
resources allocation) ... 
3) A main emphasis would be on creativity and search for new 
policy alternatives, with explicit attention to encouragement of innova- 
tive t l u h q . . .  
4) There would be extensive reliance on ... qualitative 
methods.. . 
5) There would be much more emphasis on futuristic thnking . . . 
6) The approach would be looser and less rigid, but nevertheless 
systematic, one whch would recognize the complexity of means-ends 
interdependence, the multiplicity of relevant criteria of decision, and 
the partial and tentative nature of every analysis..." 
The immediate practical question is, how can political and institutional con- 
siderations be handled with the same professional competence as the more fam- 
iliar technical and economic factors. One possibility is suggested by the notion 
of "political feasibilityH-a notion that is used frequently, if loosely, in policy dis- 
cussions. To take political feasibility seriously means to be prepared to list the 
specific political and institutional constraints that limit the freedom of choice of 
the policy makers.88 Once these constraints have been made explicit, it will 
often be possible to estimate the consequences of small variations on the cost of 
achieving the policy objectives. In this way, a rough estimate of the opportunity 
costs of a political constraint can be obtained.39 Suppose, for example, that a 
publicly owned oil company is considering where to locate a new refinery. If 
government policy forces the company to build the plant in a part of the country 
in need of special economic assistance, the implied cost oP t h s  political con- 
straint can be evaluated by reference to a situation in whch the constraint is 
not present. 
As long as policy analysis is conceived as systems analysis writ large, the 
role of the political analyst is entirely analogous to that of the economist or of 
q e h e z k e l  Dror, "Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government Service," Atblic Ad- 
ministrufia Review, vol. 27, no. 3, 1067, pp.200-201. Quoted by Aaron Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy 
Analysis From PPBS," A t b l u  Administnztion Reviaw, vol. 28, no. 2, 1969, pp.18S202. This paper by 
Wildavskp, and his earlier essay, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems 
Analysis, and Program Budge-," Public Administmtion Reviaw, vol. 26, no. 6, pp.282-310, probably 
represent the most influential criticism of systems analysis by a political scientist. 
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the technical expert: he translates his assessment of the political situation into 
a set of constraints and, together with other specialists, estimates the conse- 
quences of those constraints tor the expected level of achievement of the policy 
objectives. 
The second direction in which a differentiation between systems analysis 
and policy analysis has been sought is quite different, since it emphasizes the 
process rather than the outputs or outcomes of policy making. Here the analyst 
is viewed less as a problem solver or advisor than as designer of procedures for 
group decisionmaking, and as a catalyst in the implementation process. The 
advocates of t h s  process-oriented view of analysis are impressed by the enor- 
mous complexity of policy making, and by the cognitive and information- 
processing limitations of the human mind. This lack of match between intellec- 
tual capacity and the complelcity of social processes dooms to failure any 
attempt to find complete and explicit solutions to policy problems. Policy prob- 
lems are never solved, but only shifted and (sometimes) ameliorated. O r ,  
rather, to the extent that a policy problem is temporarily resolved (i.e., 
removed from the agenda of issues under current debate), this happens because 
a consensus has been reached by the participants in the policy process, not 
because a solution, in the sense of normative analysis, has been found. But if 
policy problems are resolved by social interactions (bargaining, decentralized 
markets, voting, persuasion, and so on), what role is left for policy analysts to 
play? 
Charles Lindblom, whose writings represent the most articulate and influen- 
tial expression of the process-oriented approach, recognizes three distinct 
forms of adaptation of analysis to interaction:* 
One is analysis by any participant of how he can play his interac- 
tive role better to get what he wants-frankly partisan analysis asklng 
"What shall I buy?" or "How shall I vote?" or (for a businessman) "How 
Politick?", cit. 
4Charles E. Lindblom, Fbl i f iw  And Markots, New York: Basic Books, Lnc., 1977, p.316. See also 
can I increase sales?" or (for a legislator) "How can I get this bill 
through the House?" The second is analysis of how to enter into exist- 
ing interactions most successfully to acheve some public purpose 
whch one, as a public official, has a responsibility to pursue. "Should 
taxes be cut to stimulate employment?" "Should criminal penalties for 
street crime be increased?" The third is analysis of possible changes 
in the basic structure of the interaction processes themselves. 
"Should markets be made more competitive by breaking up big busi- 
ness?" "Should the criminal justice system be revamped?" "What 
changes are required in parliamentary organizations?" 
Notice how the three kinds of adaptation roughly correspond to the histori- 
cal development of ASA, from the early applications of operations research to 
specific problems of tactics and logistics, through the broader concerns of sys- 
tems analysis, to the preoccupation with institutional reform which character- 
izes contemporary policy analysis. Probably the most important insight to 
emerge from a serious reflection on this development is the reoognition that 
analysis has a procedural as well as a substantive function. It provides not only 
evidence and arguments, but also an intellectual structure for the policy pro- 
cess. Even when its conclusions are not accepted, its categories and language, 
its rational ordering of general ideas affect-even condition-the policy debate. 
The importance of this procedural function is directly related to the basic lack 
of certainty of policy determinations. When the correctness of a decision can be 
established unambiguously, the manner in which it is reached is largely irnma- 
terial; only results count. But when the factual and value premises are uncer- 
tain and controversial, when objective criteria of success or failure are lacking, 
the formal characteristics of the decision process-its procedure-become signi- 
ficant. Harvey Brooks draws a revealing analogy between a~ralysis and legal pro- 
D.Braybro&e and C.E. Lindblom, A Strufegg of Lhcision, New York: Free Press, 1963. 
"Harvey Brooks, "Environmental Decision M a :  Analysis and Values," in When Values Cbn- 
fLicf, L.H. Tribe, C.S. Schehg ,  end J. Voss, editors, Cambridge, Maesachusetts: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1876, pp. 115136, 115. 
The usefulness of systems analysis depends on the fact that its 
conclusions purport to  be based on a se t  of neutral principles that  
command a wider consensus than those conclusions themselves would 
be likely to command without a demonstration that  they are logically 
deducible from such principles. In t h s  sense, policy or systems 
analysis perform a function with respect to political-technological deci- 
sions sirnilar to  that performed by a judicial process with respect to 
conflicts between individuals. A court decision is accepted by the 
disputing parties largely because it is based on a set  of rules both par- 
ties accept applied through a procedure which both parties are  
prepared, before knowing its outcome, to accept as unbiased. 
One does not have to  agree with Brooks that  analytical conclusions can be 
formally deduced, m r e  geometrico, from a set  of "neutral principles," to recog- 
nize the importance of his observations. In our societies the rationality and legi- 
timacy of public policies depend increasingly on procedural, even more than on 
substantive, considerations. But for analysis t o  perform a quasi-judicial function 
with respect to  policy decisions, its own rules of evidence and procedure must  
be spelled out in great detail. As I shall argue in the second part  of this chapter, 
this calls for a determined effort by the ASA profession to  develop standards of 
adequacy and suitable mechanisms of quality control. 
4. .. . AND BACK TO OPERATIONS EEESEARCH 
I shall at tempt to  summarize the preced~ng discussion by exhibiting in 
tabular form the distinguishmg features and characteristic problems of the  
three stages of ASA, as shown in Table dlP2 
A t  t h s  point, two clarifications are  necessary to avoid misunderstandings. 
First, the terminological &stinctions among operations research, systems 
analysis, and policy analysis, whle fairly common in English-speaking countries 
(but not without some ambiguities even there:  where, for instance, does 
*his table expands an analogous clessification proposed by Roger E. Levien in "Outcome Peas  
management science fit in the series?), are by no means universally accepted or 
used. In many countries a single label like "operations research" applies to all 
three stages or forms of analysis that have been distinguished here. In such a 
case, "operations research" assumes exactly the same meaning as "applied sys- 
tems analysis," as the term has been used in this chapter. 
Second, it is important to realize that a classi.lication like the one suggested 
by Table is only a cross section or time slice of the entire process of &sci- 
plinary evolution. To obtain a complete evolutionary representation one would 
have to combine a cross-sectional description with a longitudinal study. Such a 
cross-sectional and longitudmal study of operations research, for example, 
would show, not only the successive changes in the pool of concepts and tech- 
niques available a t  different points in time, but also a continuous evolution in 
aims, methods, and evaluative criteria (in short, in the self-image of the discip- 
line) reflecting, at least in part, analogous developments in systems and policy 
analysis, Instead of a linear development, in whch systems analysis follows 
operations research and is followed by policy analysis-a linear order which has 
d,a ler / , L A /  
been adopted here only for expository reasons-what we have in fact is a sequence 
A 
in which different modes of analysis coexist in more or less close mutual 
interaction. Thus, in recent issues of journals like Berat im Research and 
Management Science one finds articles on air-pollution control and water .quality 
management, on majority voting and distributional constraints on public expen- 
diture planning, on evaluation of the quality of social services and implementa- 
tion of new ideas in bureaucracies, on decision analysis and medical malprac- 
tice, even on the design of electoral districts-topics and papers that could have 
appeared also in Policy Sciences, Policy Analysis, or some economics journal. 
It has already been noted that the most important factor tying the different 
specializations and approaches of ASA together is the way in which an initial 
problem develops and mixes with other issues to form a "lattice" of descendant 
urement A U.S. Viewpoint," unpublished manuscript, ILASA, 1980. 
Table 2 . 1 .  ~istinguishing features and characteristic problems 
at three stages of applied systems analysis. 
Policy Analysis 
(1960s-1970s) 
Problem formulation; 
analysis of distributional 
consequences and institu- 
tional constraints; design 
of decisionmaking procedures. 
Political and administrative 
feasibility; consensus on 
policy. 
Public policy making; ill- 
defined goals; institutional 
framework given; public 
finance and political eoonany; 
organization theory; data 
analysis and large-scale 
social experimentation. 
Policy planning; reform of 
existing national systems 
of health, education, or 
social security; pollution 
control; program evaluation; 
program implementation. 
Systems Analysis 
(1 950s) 
Resource allocation; 
analysis of conflicting 
systems; system design. 
Economic (allocative) 
efficiency . 
Group decisionmaking; 
policy and goals given; 
operations embedded in 
larger sociotechnical 
systems ; micmeamanics; 
constrained optimization; 
decision and game theory; 
simulation ; econorrretrics . 
Choice among weapon 
systems; strategic 
studies; resource allo- 
cation in a national 
health system; develop- 
mentofwater resources. 
Disciplinary 
aims 
Evaluation 
criteria 
characteristic 
features and 
methods 
Typical 
applications 
Operations Research 
(1 940s) 
Discovery of empirical 
regularities in operations; 
operational design; 
prediction and testing. 
Technical efficiency; 
cost minimization. 
Unitary decisionmaking; 
system, policy, and goals 
given; statistical infer- 
ence; differential equa- 
tions; search theory; 
queuing and inventory 
models; control theory. 
Tactical operations; 
logistics; production 
scheduling; waiting lines; 
inventory control; 
programming. 
problems. Energy policy modeling is a good example of this phenomenon. The 
first energy models developed in the early 1970s dealt largely with technical and 
economic issues that could be handled by standard OR method. There were 
short- and medium-term linear programming models of energy supplies, and 
econometric models of energy demands; quadratic programming models of 
price-responsive oil demands and supplies, and the resulting international 
equilibrium; year-by-year simulations of electric utilities pricing and 
equipment-ordering policies, and so on.43 The omission of social, political, and 
institutional considerations-health and environmental effects of different 
modes of energy production, safety problems, the  risk of nuclear proliferation, 
issues of "scale" and of the  political implications of alternative energy p,aths-did 
not appear to be too serious in the early stages of the policy debate. But as 
opinions have become polarized and public appreciation of the more remote 
implications of policy choices has increased, the need to  deal explicitly also with 
the broader social and political issues has been generally accepted by the 
modeling community. After years of rather fruitless debate, even the most 
technically-minded analysts have been forced to recognize that  technology and 
economics can play only a limited role in the ongoing energy controversy, and 
that energy policy is inherently an interdisciplinary field. "It involves econom- 
ics, law, politics, engineering, resource geology, biomedical impacts, and 
environmental risk assessment-along with the  methodologies that are  already 
familiar to the operations researcher: optimization algorithms, simulations, 
decision analysis and econometric estimation. "& 
The case of energy policy modeling raises another issue of the utmost 
importance today for all applied systems analysts: the role and effectiveness of 
formal analysis in the policy process. But this takes us beyond the strictly disci- 
plinary aspects of the evolution of ASA, and into the professional and socio- 
institutional dimensions to which we now turn. 
-For a very useful recent survey, see f i n  S. Manne, Richard G. Richels, and John P. Weyant, 
"Energy Policy Mode*: A Survey," Opsrcrtions Resoarch, vol. 27, no. 1, January-February 1978, 
pp.1-38. 
uhid., p.1. 
5. THE SOCIAL SIDE OF ASA: PROFESSIONAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOF'MENTS 
The preced~ng sections have largely dealt with the "internal hstory" of 
ASA-the development of concepts, methods, and techniques in response to the 
changing nature of the objects of inquiry, and to intellectual challenges arising 
within the profession. This intellectual development must now be related to the 
larger social context in which analysts operate. The question to be investigated 
now is how the hstorical development of institutions and roles, publications and 
incentive systems both reflect and influence the intellectual concerns and 
aspirations of the ASA profession. 
It has already been suggested that neither approach-internal, intellectual 
history on the one hand, external, social history, on the other-is by itself suffi- 
cient to give an adequate account of the entire development of the field. Social 
or institutional factors do not explain, for example, the cycles of expansion and 
depression experienced by certain areas of research and application, such as 
game theory. O n  the other hand, national differences in style and aims of ASA 
activity cannot be explained only, or even primarily, on intellectual grounds. 
Thus, the fact that industrial operations research in the United States adopted 
quite early a systems approach, has been attributed to the h g h  degree of spe- 
;fl 
cialization and professionalization of applied$ustrial research there. At the 
txme the operations researchers arrived on the scene (the first public meeting 
between operations researchers and industrial managers took place only in 
1951, in Cleveland) industrial engineering, statistical quality control, marketing, 
personnel and financial management, were already recognized fields of profes- 
sional specialization. Hence, according to t h s  theory, in order to define a field 
of cognitive exclusiveness, American operations researchers had to focus on the 
interactions of specific industrial functions and the organization as a whole.45 
One need not agree fully with the explanation to recognize that t i e  factors 
involved are institutional rather than disciphary. Similarly, the relatively late 
&R.L. Ackoff, "A Comparison of Operational Research in the U.S.A. and in Great Britain," @em- 
find Resoamh Quartsrly, vol. 8, no. 2, J-iane 1957, pp.80-100. 
development of academic operations research in Europe, as well as the difficulty 
of establishng academic curricula in policy analysis, are largely due to institu- 
tional and sociological differences existing between European and American 
university systems. 
At t h s  point some chronology may be helpful. The first OR professional 
society was formed in the United Kingdom in 1948 as the Operational Research 
Society (initially, Operational Research Club). The Operations Research Society 
of America followed in 1952, with Philip M. Morse as its first president. The ini- 
tial membershp of both societies included many scientists who had taken part 
in the development of military OR during World W a r  2. However, the focus of 
professional interest was rapidly shifting to industrial applications. One sign of 
this redirection of professional interests is the foundation in 1953 of The Insti- 
tute of Management Sciences-an international society, but with most of its 
members in the United States. In 1957, the first International Conference on 
Operational Research was held at  Oxford University. It was attended by 250 
delegates from 21 countries. One important outcome of this conference was the 
International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS), formally 
constituted on January 1, 1959, with three initial members: Operational 
Research Society, Operations Research Society of America, and ~oc i6 t6  Fran- 
mL 
yaise de Recherche 0~6ration:lle (founded in 1956).'~ Between 1959 and 1975. 
twenty-four additional national societies were founded in Western and Eastern 
Europe, Asia, Latin America, Australia, and South Africa, and soon joined IFORS. 
Operations research journals follow closely the developmental pattern of 
professional societies, starting with the @eratima1 Research Quarterly, 
founded in 1950 and published by the UK Operational Research Society, and 
@mations Research (1 952), published by the Operations Research Society of 
America. In all fields of learning, scholarly periodicals are among the most 
powerful institutions of science, and ASA is no exception in t h s  respect. In fact, 
"For additional information and bibiiographical references, see the useful article by Hugh J. 
Miser, "The History, Nature, and Use of Operations Research," in Handbook of OpemtCns Resacach, 
Joseph J. H d e r  and Salah E. Elmaghraby, editors, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1878, 
vd. 1, pp.924. 
if it is true that even in the older natural sciences "the very raison d'gtre of 
many scientific societies lies primarily in the journals they sponsor, only secon- 
darily in their formal meetings ,"47 in the case of ASA professional journals some- 
times take the place of professional societies. For instance, while no profes- 
sional societies existed until 1980 in the field of policy analysis, policy analysts 
in government, universities, and research institutes tended to gravitate intellec- 
tually toward publications like Policy Sciences, founded in 1970, and Policy 
Analysis, founded in 1975. In these cases, the lack of a sponsoring professional 
organization was compensated, to some extent, by the presence of very large 
(by usual standards) editorial boards. 
Communication between analysts and decisionmakers is one of the crucial 
practical problems of ASA. Since the increasing specialization of the field 
creates serious language barriers, publications have begun to appear whose pri- 
mary goal is encouraging interactions between producers and consumers of 
analysis, as well as between the various &visions and professional groups w i t h  
the ASA community. Perhaps the best known exemplar of this literature is 
inte~j 'aces ,  published jointly since 1974 by The Institute of Management Sciences 
and the Operations Research society of America (it originated in 1971 as The 
M e t i n  of TIMS). 
Havlng stressed the role played by journals in the disciplinary and profes- 
sional development of ASA, it is important to note also some of their problems 
and limitations. The first problem, mentioned here only briefly, since it will be 
discussed in the next section, is that of the critical criteria used in the referee- 
ing process. How to reconcile rigor with relevance is the crucial Mficulty. The 
desire for rlgor, especially in the hlghly specialized sense of formal or axiomatic 
rigor in which the term is often used, may (and often does) prevail over the 
requirements of relevance. In the trend toward greater formalization some cri- 
tics see the possibility that ASA may lose its identity and be assimilated into 
"Stephen Toulmin, op. cit., p.2M. 
other fields of inquiry.48 
A second difficulty in assessing the state of ASA through professional publi- 
cations is that journals and research reports tend to give a distorted picture of 
the field-a picture which is strongly biased in the direction of theoretical 
developments. For security, proprietary, or other reasons actual applications 
are not published, or may appear in print with a delay of years. Thus, one of the 
most famous studies in military systems analysis, the Strategic Bases Study 
conducted by Albert Wohlstetter and other Rand analysts, was initiated in 1951, 
completed in 1954, declassified in 1962, and discussed in a professional journal 
only in 1 9 6 4 . ~ ~  Even when actual case studies are reported, the necessity of con- 
cealing the identity of the sponsor and the true nature of the problem investi- 
gated often induces a stylized presentation in which many of the details that are 
so important for understandmg the craft aspects of ASA are completely lost. 
Next to journals, standard textbooks represent an important locus of scien- 
tific authority, and the main channel by which the intellectual advances of a dis- 
cipline become the collective property of a profession. 
Whereas the "micro-evolution" of scientific ideas is manifested in 
the most up-to-date research discussions ... its "macro-evolution" is 
embodied in the standard texts accepted as authoritative in each suc- 
cessive generation ... . [Tlhese standard works define the successive 
bodies of doctrine that form the accepted starting-points for the next 
generation. By digesting the specialized literature of the preceding 
generation, indeed, these comprehensive expositions create a "concep- 
tual platform" on whch the next generation of budding scientists can 
stand firm, in defirung and attacking their own disciplinary problems.50 
The successive stages of development of ASA are clearly marked by a series 
of dishnguished texts, starting with Morse and fimball's Methods o j  @mations 
e ~ o r  a recent expression of this view, see Seth Bonder, "Changing the Future of Operations 
Research," @mations Research, vol. 27, no. 2, March-April 1979, pp.20e22-4. 
%ee Bruce L.R. Smith, me RAND Cb7potcJiorr,.Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Umversity 
Press, 1966, pp. 195-240. 
soStephen Taulmin, Ihuncrn Ihrdorsfaruiang, cit., pp.277-278. 
Research, issued as a classified technical report in 1946 and published commer- 
cially five years later. A comparison of the table of contents of this text with 
that of the influential Introduction to Opmations Research by West Churchman, 
Ackoff, and Arnoff," published in 1957, reveals graphcally the sh f t  of profes- 
sional interests from military to industrial problems, as well as the emergence 
of new (or rediscovered) analytic methods like queuing and inventory theory, 
linear programming, and game theory. 
This first post-War textbook in operations research has been followed by 
scores of texts, treatises, and reference works now appearing with increasing 
frequency in all industrialized countries. The award in 1969 of the Lanchester 
Prize of the Operations Research Society of America to Harvey Wagner's Ainci- 
ples of Operations Research is another indication of the professional significance 
of an outstanding didactic work. The sheer size of Wagner's book is evidence of 
the number of ideas and methods that were sufficiently well developed and 
tested by the end of the 1960s to be expounded in an introductory presentation 
of basic principles. Yet the differences from earlier works like the Churchman, 
Ackoff, and Arnoff lntmducti072 are not merely quantitative. As an interesting 
example of the process of conceptual selection referred to previously, I may 
mention the fact that game theory, which received chapter-length treatment in 
the lnt70duciiott, is omitted in Wagner's R-inciples, except for the minimax 
theorem of two-person, zero-sum games-relegated to an exercise in the chapter 
Again, while the earlier Int7oductim grew from lecture material prepared 
for short courses in operations research, Wagner's text reflects a stage of 
development in whch undergraduate and graduate courses in operations 
51C. West Churchman, Russell L. Ackoff, and E. Leonard Amoif, Introduction to Opemtions 
Resoanh, New York John Wiley and Sans, 1857. 
%s omission corresponds to the judgment often, if not so caustically, expressed in profession- 
al circles that "[iln practicing operations research, we have found that game theory does not contri- 
bute any munugo*l insights to  real competitive and cooperative decision-making behavior that are 
not airsady familiar to church-going poker players who regularly read the Wall Street J o u d . "  See 
Harvey M. Wagner, %nciples of  Opsmtions Rosscrrch, Englewood Cliffs, New Jemey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1975, 2nd edition, p.X. This should be compared with the opinion expressed some twenty years 
earlier by Ackoff and co-authors (op. cit., p.519), that game theory "started a new way of thinking 
about competitive decisions." 
research form a well established component of academic curricula in business, 
economics, engineering, and public administration. 
No comparable standard presentations of systems analysis exist, but Hitch 
and McKean's The Economics of Defense in the  Nuclear Age (published in 1960) 
represents nevertheless a milestone in the evolution of ASA. While the title and 
many of the examples in the text refer to military applications, the underlying 
philosophy is completely general. As the authors write,53 
[i]n this book we will be concerned with economics in its most gen- 
eral sense. Economics is not exclusively concerned ... with certain 
types of activities (industrial) rather than others ( d i t a r y ) ,  or with the 
traditional points of view of budgeteers and comptrollers. Being truly 
economical does not mean scrimping -reducing expenditures no 
matter how important the things to be bought. Nor does it mean 
implementing some stated doctrine regardless of cost. Rather 
economics is concerned with allocating resources-choosing doctrines 
and techmqu8s-so as to get the most out of available resources. 
The E c a o m i c s  of Defense is the intellectual product of an institution, the 
Rand Corporation, whose name stands for one of the most influential "schools" of 
systems analysis, and whose organization and style of work have been imitated 
throughout the world. The history of the institution in its most creative period 
is well documented, and need not be retold here." However, the hstory of Rand 
raises an issue of organizational design for policy research institutes that is too 
central to our discussion to be ignored. Why was the nongovernmental, nonpro- 
fit form of organization chosen for Rand and for other policy research institutes 
like Resources for the Future, the Stanford Research Institute, the Broohngs 
Institution, and, more recently, the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis? Other institutional solutions were, after all, possible-as part of the 
government staff, or of a university, or as a (for profit) consulting firm. But 
6sChtirles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Deferrso in t h  Nuclear Ago, cit., 
pp. 1-2. Footnote omitted. 
each of these alternatives presents serious disadvantages for the h n d  of 
work-medium to long range, multidisciplinary, independent, and objective-that 
a high-level policy research institute is supposed to do.'' Research carried out 
by government agencies tends to be of a narrow and short-run nature because 
the problems immediately facing such agencies are typically narrow and short- 
run. Also, the incentive structure of large bureaucracies does not favor 
independent opinions and serious efforts at deep understanding. Blackett, it 
may be recalled, had argued that the atmosphere required for an operations 
research group "is that of a first-class pure scientific research institution, and 
the caliber of the personnel should match t h . ~ s . " ~ ~  This seems to suggest the 
university as a suitable environment for ASA activities. Unfortunately, universi- 
ties are structured largely along disciplinary lines, and the cost of breaking 
down those lines in order to attack policy problems (which by their very nature 
cut across disciplinary boundaries) can be prohibitively b h .  Again, the incen- 
tive system of the university, with its emphasis on'publication in specialized 
journals and on peer recognition, is not conducive to policy-relevant research. 
Finally, an organization operating for profit depends on the financial support of 
its clients and consequently tends to concentrate on short-run and limited prob- 
lems, like in-house government policy research. And since, in addition, a con- 
sulting firm must show "concrete results" to justify its fee, it will tend to look at 
the more easily quantifiable aspects of policy problems, where standard tools 
and techniques can be applied directly. 
The nongovernmental, nonprofit form of organization has emerged as a 
response to the failure of other institutional arrangements to provide a conge- 
nial atmosphere for carrying out fundamental, independent, multidisciplinary 
policy research. This is not to say that the results have been uniformly good. In 
fact, nonprofit institutions present their own characteristic problems and 
dangers. To a large extent, these are related to the lack of generally accepted 
%Bruce L.R. Smith lhta RAND C o ~ p o m t i o n ,  cit. 
=For a related discussion, see William Gorharn, "Why Policy Research Institutes?", IIASA 
Research Memorandum 7556,  November 1875, and Bruce L.R. Smith, cit., ch. 2. 
mP.M. S. Blackett, op. cit . , p. 175. 
criteria for evaluating their performance, and to the ever-present possibility of 
conflict between professional excellence and practical effectiveness. These 
issues will be discussed in the next section. 
6. THE EVOLUTION 07 CRlTElUA OF QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The existence of suitable mechanisms of quality control is one of the distin- 
guishing features of a well-established profession. Professional quality controls 
fulfill a double function: an internal one, to ensure adherence to group expecta- 
tions about performance by members of the profession; and an external one, to 
ensure that the users of professional services can rely on their being of an 
acceptable quality. Ideally, the two functions, and the corresponding criteria, 
should integrate and support each other. In practice conflicts can and do arise, 
especially in the case of young professions Like ASA, and then it is not clear 
which function should prevail. General prescriptions are useless, and only a 
detailed knowledge of the current stage and historical development of the pro- 
fession can suggest sensible compromises. 
Naturally, the importance of quality standards has been recognized since 
the beginning of ASA. Some of the citations given in previous sections from 
Blackett's early memoranda show this quite clearly; and the charter of the 
Operations Research Society of America states as one of the purposes of the 
society "the establishment and maintenance of professional standards of com- 
petence for work known as operations research." But for many years the issue 
of quality standards remained dormant, only to explode in the early 1970s-in a 
form for whch the analytic profession was intellectually unprepared. A 
knowledge of these developments is helpful for understanding the nature of ASA 
as an intellectual craft, and its evolution. 
The first practitioners of operations research had little doubt that what 
they were doing was scientific in character, despite the differences in the 
objects of inquiry-military operations - or, more generally, man-machine 
systems-from those of tradrtional scientific research. The main goal of 
operations research was "to find a scientific explanation of the facts." For, as 
C.H. Waddington explains, "[olnly when this is done can the two main objects of 
operational research be attained. These are the prediction of the effects of new 
weapons and of new  tactic^."'^ According to Blackett's crisp formulation, 
"[olperational staff provide the scientists with the operational outlook and data. 
The scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to these data, and are thus 
able to give useful advice."5B 
Similarly, in the definition of OR adopted by the Operational Research 
Society of Britain, the word "science" or "scientific" occurs three times. Opera- 
tions research is proclaimed to be the application of the methods of science to 
complex problems; a discipline whose distinctive approach is the development of 
a scientific model of the system being analyzed, and whose purpose is to help 
management determine its policy and actions scientifically. 
Given t b s  paradigm, the relevant standards of quality are those of the 
natural sciences. In fact, the situations investgated by operations researchers 
dur~ng the W a r  fit the paradigm quite well. Typically, military operations could 
be regarded as representative of a class of repetitive situations "where theories 
built up in response to earlier examples of the situation could be checked out 
against later examples, monitored while proposals for improved action were in 
use, and used to detect their own dwindling validity as the situations ~hanged." '~ 
The first industrial applications of the post-War period presented many of the 
same features and, as in the case of Leslie C. Edie's "Traffic Delays a t  Toll 
Booths," explicitly appealed to the same scientific criteria of evaluation and cri- 
ticism. 
Another important characteristic which early industrial OR shared with mil- 
itary OR was a reasonable clarity in the definition of the roles of analysts and 
decisionmakers. Whether the users of analysis were hqh-level officers or hqh- 
level managers, analysis was done primarily, and often (because of the 
"C .H. Waddmgton, OR in Wmld War 2, London: ELEK Science Ltd., 1973, p .m.  
M ~ .  M. S. Blackett, Studies of War, cit . , p. 17 1 .  
?Hylton Boothroyd, Articu(ate ktswsntwn,  cit., p.113. 
requirements of military or industrial secrecy) exclusively, for them. The 
analyst did not have to address himself to any audience other than the decision- 
maker, or a small group of decisionmakers, who had commissioned the study. 
Problems of implementation could be safely assumed to be the responsibility of 
a well-defined berarchical authority, and the same authority could establish, if 
not standards of quality, a t  least criteria of effectiveness. 
Already in the early 1950s all t h s  was changing, at  an increasingly rapid 
rate. Changes in personnel were accompanied by changes in the nature of the 
problems analysts were investigatmg, and in the institutional context in whch 
analysis was done. As natural scientists like BLackett, Waddmgton, and Morse 
were returning to their university departments and laboratories, the new gen- 
eration of analysts entering the profession-mathematicians, logicians, statisti- 
cians, control theorists-was more interested in the formal aspects of scientific 
research, and often lacked the craft skills and the maturity of critical judgment 
of the old m a ~ t e r s . ' ~  At the same time, the problems claiming analytic attention 
were becoming more abstract and complex. Strategic issues, whether in busi- 
ness or government, loomed increasingly important on the frontier of profes- 
sional thinking and practice. Subjective uncertainty was seen to be much more 
crucial than statistical regularities or deterministic models. And the increasing 
role played by ASA in the public sector meant that analysts-no longer discreet 
advisors to the prince, but actors in a political process in which advocacy and 
persuasion could not be neatly separated from objective analysis-had to pay 
attention to questions of equity, and of institutional feasibility. The high uncer- 
tainty surrounding strategic problems and the long times needed to implement 
a proposed solution also meant that beet empirical verification of analytic con- 
clusions was often impossible. If in 1953, George E. Kirnball could still say of 
e"'By now a new generation of officers and analysts has come on the scene, many of whom have 
never had the sobering experience of seeing their optimistic predictions disproved by deaths on the 
battlefield. They too often are willing to take the assumptions given them by designers and by 'intel- 
hence'  as gospel truth, and to base their calculations on them without adding any correction factors 
far 'the fog of war'." Philip 66. Morse, Letter to the Editor, Operutions Research, vol. 20, no. 1, 
January-February 1872, pp.23%242, 240. 
operations research that:e1 
It is based on the conviction that the factors affecting ... opera- 
tions can be measured quantitatively and that there exist common 
laws obeyed by the basic variables ... . The main problems concerning 
operations research today are the discovery of such laws and the 
development of techniques . . . for rapid, simple application.. . 
his younger colleagues were increasingly skeptical about the possibility of dis- 
covering "laws of operations," and whether, indeed,' the &scovery of laws was a 
meaningful professional aim. At the time Kimball was writing, the move away 
from description (and generalization) to prescription as the hallmark of the sys- 
tems analyst was already clearly discernible. 
Now, the implications of these developments for the search for professional 
standards of quality are quite far-reaching. If it is no longer possible to believe 
in the objective validity of the conclusions of an analytic study, and if even the 
criteria of success of the decision it supports are ambiguous, then evaluation by 
results becomes meaningless, and must be replaced by such process-oriented 
criteria as internal consistency and professional (or even political) consensus. 
The shift toward process-oriented evaluation is quite visible in the list of 13 
criteria worked out by the Lanchester Prize Committee in 1957 in order to sup- 
plement the broad, but not very operational, guidelines adopted by the preced- 
ing  committee^.^^ However, the issue of professional standards for ASA came 
truly &ve only in 1971, with the publication of "Guidelines for the Practice of 
Operations Research prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Operations 
Research Society of ~ m e r i c a . ' ~  The particular controversy that led to the forma- 
tion of the Ad Hoc Committee does not concern us here, except for the fact that 
in that controversy well-known analysts, applying standard technical tools to the 
same policy issues, had come to opposite conclusions and recommendations. 
"George E. Kimball, "A Philosophy of Operations Research," Abstract, q3enrt ions Research, vol. 
1, 1953, p.145, cited in Harvey 66. Wagner, "The ABC's of OR," Opemtions Research, vol. 18, no. 6, Oc- 
tober 1971, pp.125&1281. 
%ee Report of the Lanchester Prize Committee, @errrtions Rase-h, vol. 5, no. 4, August 1957, 
pp. 575-578. 
The primary concern of the Committee was, in the words of the President of the 
Society, "the professional conduct of the debate, the quality of the argumenta- 
tion, the adherence to established study procedures in operations research and 
systems analysis. "13~ 
Unfortunately, most comments on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee were 
directed at  an Appendix where the behavior of some of the participants in the 
substantive debate had been severely castigated. With a few notable excep- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  the Guidelines themselves received little attention, aside from some cur- 
sory remarks on their innocuous, if laudable, character. Ths is indeed a pity, 
for the ASA profession could have greatly benefited from a critical examination 
of the specific standards proposed, and of the outdated philosophy of science on 
which they rested. The philosophy of the report gives great emphasis to two 
dichotomies: "pure" and "applied" science on the one hand, and "analysis" 
versus "advocacy" on the other. I shall now briefly indicate why these distinc- 
tions are irrelevant, if not positively misleachg, in the context of a discussion of 
professional practice." 
To begin with, the most significant similarities between science and ASA are 
to be found not in the outcome,  but in the process  of research, more precisely, in 
the craft aspects cornmon to all forms of disciplined intellectual inquiry. The 
actual work of the scientist requires knowledge that is acquired only through 
practice and precept and whch therefore is not scientific in character. This 
craft knowledge is a repertoire of procedures and judgments that are partly 
personal, partly social. Thus, when a scientist decides whether a batch of data is 
of acceptable quality, he applies standards that derive from h s  own experience, 
but also reflect the professional norms of h s  teachers and colleagues, as well as 
culturally determined criteria of adequacy. Personal and social judgments are 
rnOpetcrtions Research, vol. 18, no. 5, September 1971 ,  pp.1123-1148 
Mbid., p. 1123. 
q w o  such exceptions are Harvey M. Wagner, "Commentary on ORSA Guidelines," and Ian I. 66itr- 
off, "The Myth of Objectivity or Why Science Needs a New Psychology of Science," both in Managem.mt 
Scioncr, vol. 18, no. 10, June 1972, pp. B-6OQ to B-613, and B-613 to  B-618, respectively. 
WFor more detailed arguments, see Giandomenieo Majone, "Policies as Theories," h r g a ,  vol. 8, 
no. 2, 1900, pp.151-162, and "The Craft of Applied Systems Andysis," Laxenburg, Austria, forthcoming, 
as well as the papers by Wagner and Mitroff cited in the preceding footnote. 
also involved in data manipulation, in the choice of tools and models, in the 
selection of evidence, and in the construction of an argument. 
The importance of craft knowledge and experience is even greater in ASA. 
Because the conclusions of a systems study cannot be proved in the sense in 
whch a theorem is proved, or even in the manner in whlch propositions of 
natural science are established, they must satisfy generally accepted criteria of 
adequacy. Such criteria are.derived not from abstract logical canons (the rules 
of the mytbcal "scientific method") but from craft experience, depending as 
they do on the special features of the problem, on the quality of the data and 
limitations of the available tools, on the time constraints imposed on the 
analysts, and on the requirements of the sponsor and/or decisionmaker. 
In short, craft knowledge-less explicit than formalized theoretical 
knowledge, but more objective than pure intuition-is essential for doing sys- 
tems analysis as well as for evaluating it. Not artificial distinctions between 
pure and applied science, between analysis and advocacy, but close attention to 
the fine structure of the analyst's task is what is required for serious evaluation. 
This structure can be described in terms of categories like data, information, 
tools, evidence, and argument that are applicable to  any type and style of 
analysis, retrospective as well as prospective, descriptive as well as prescriptive, 
argumentative as well as "scientific." Take, for example, the category "evi- 
dence." Evidence is not synonymous with data or information; it is information 
selected from the available stock and introduced at  a specific point in the argu- 
ment in order to persuade a particular auhence of the truth or falsity of a 
statement. Selecting inappropriate data or models, placing them a t  the wrong 
point in an argument, or choosing a style of presentation wbch is not appropri- 
ate for the intended audience, can destroy the effectiveness of information used 
as evidence, regardless of its intrinsic cognitive value. Hence, criteria for 
assessing evidence must be different from those for assessing "facts." Facts can 
be evaluated in terms of standard scientific criteria, but evidence must be 
evaluated in accordance with a number of factors peculiar to a given situation, 
such as the specific nature of the case, the type of audience, the prevaihng 
"rules of evidence" (including, of course, all relevant scientific rules), and even 
the persuasiveness of the analyst. Thus the assessment of the quality of the evi- 
dence presented in an analytic study is a microcosm of the complex social pro- 
cess of evaluation in whlch scientific and extra-scientific, objective and advocacy 
elements are inextricably intertwined. 
Analogous problems arise in evaluating the practical effectiveness of ASA 
studies. Unlike the analyses of military operations conducted in wartime, and 
some small-scale industrial applications, it is extremely difficult, as already 
mentioned, to evaluate the usefulness of large-scale policy studies in terms of 
actual results produced. This is due to a number of reasons. First, the long 
time lag between the adoption of a policy recommendation and its actual imple- 
mentation. Second, the difficulty of sorting out the effects of a particular deci- 
sion from arnong a multitude. of confounding factors. Thrd, and most impor- 
tant, the social and institutional context in which systems analysis is done has 
changed dramatically in the last two decades. In the early days the relationship 
between decisionmaker and advisor, between producer and user of analysis was 
much clearer than it is today. This is still reflected in the ORSA "Guidelines for 
the Practice of Operations Research," though the description given there of the 
client-analyst relationship was probably already outdated at the time the Guide- 
lines were published. Now it is quite common for policy research to be spon- 
sored by one organization, carried out by another, utilized by a third organiza- 
tion, and perhaps evaluated by yet another agency (which, in turn, may commis- 
sion the evaluation to an independent research group). Clearly, the criteria of 
effectiveness of the sponsors are not the same as those of the users, or of the 
controllers. Thus the analyst must attempt to satisfy a number of different, 
sometimes codlicting, expectations. The best he can do is to achieve some 
acceptable level of adequacy in each direction: he must "satisfice," rather than 
maximize any one particular criterion. Actually, the situation is even more 
complex than this, for many policy stu&es in fields like energy, risk assessment, 
or education are "designed to influence congressional debates and -to affect the 
climate of public opinion, not to guide decisions within individual corpora- 
t i on~ . "~ '  The effectiveness of such analyses can only be measured in terms of 
their impact on the ongoing policy aebate: their success in clarifying issues, in 
introducing new concepts and viewpoints, even in modifying people's percep- 
tions of the problem. Here analysis is no longer separable from social interac- 
tion as a problem-solving device, but becomes an integral part of the process by 
which public issues are raised, debated, and resolved.88 In fact, the hstoncal 
development of ASA provides additional evidence for the truth of the statement 
that "creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct  idea 
of the thmg, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and 
cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop."eg 
In the following, concluding section of this chapter it will be argued that the 
unavoidable complexity of the language of systems analysis reflects the funda- 
mental difficulty of separating ideas from action. 
7. CONCLUSION: THE LANGUAGE OF BSA 
As the preceding pages show, the question: How scientific is systems 
analysis? (or operations research, or management science), keeps recurring 
throughout the hstory of ASA. Tra&tional claims to scientific status for ASA 
have always been faced by what appears to  be an insoluble contracbction: if ASA 
is scientific, its task is not to prescribe or suggest a course of action, but to pro- 
vide scientific explanations and predictions; if, on the other hand, ASA aspires to 
guide action it must be prescriptive and persuasive, and hence it cannot be 
scientific-not, at  any rate, according to the received view of scientific method. 
Some ~ r i t e r s  have attempted to solve the dilemma by arguing that ASA offers 
"scientifically based" advice. But this argument is basically unsound since, as 
" ~ l a n  S. Manne, Richard G. Richels, and John P. Weyant, "Znergy Policy Modeling: A Survey," 
cit., pp.1-2. 
- - 
%n social interaction as  a mode of problem solving, see Charles E. Lindblorn, Politics And Murk- 
a h ,  New York: Basic Books, Inc., 187'7. Whereas Lindblom treats analysis and social interaction as al- 
ternative ways of solving social problems, I stress the difficulty of separating the two in practice. 
wPaul Feyerabed, Aguinst Method, London; NLB, 1875, p.26. Italics in the original. 
Hume showed two centuries ago, there is no logical bridge between "ought" and 
"is.f' 
Why do methodologically conscious systems analysts keep raising the ques- 
bon about the -scientific status of ASA, despite repeated failures to answer it 
satisfactorily? The reason, I suggest, is that behlnd it loom two issues that 
analysts rlghtly feel to be of crucial importance for an understanding of what 
they are trying to do. First: what is the language of ASA, i.e., what is the logical 
status of the different propositions an analyst produces in the course of his 
work? Second: what standards of quality and rules of methodological criticism 
are applicable to the different kinds of propositions? 
The historical evolution of the second issue has been outlined in the preced- 
ing section. In discussing the first issue, I shall make use of some concepts 
introduced there. ASA, I have argued, is a craft. The systems analyst as crafts- 
man is a producer of data, information, and arguments, but also a social change 
agent. He must influence some people to accept h s  proposals, and other people 
to carry them out; he is expected to take some responsibility tor implementa- 
tion. "Experienced practitioners realize that such implementation depends not 
only on factual analysis, but also on the client's organizational structure, the 
capabilities and biases of the client's personnel, and the client's management 
style."70 In particular, successful implementation depends on the ability to per- 
suade people that a proposed course of action is not only good for the organiza- 
tion, but also compatible with the self-interest of its members. A well-des~ned 
incentive system is a very effective form of persuasive analysis. 
Often the analyst must even persuade the decisionmaker. For example, one 
of the important functions of systematic analysis is to point out what cannot be 
done, rather than what can; in other words, it is the duty of the analyst to make 
the decisionmaker aware of constraints that he would rather ignore. But aside 
from straghtforward physical and resource constraints, it is not usually possible 
to give a logically tight proof that a certain factor is an actual constraint, rather 
%awey M. Wagner, "Cornmen- on ORSA Guidelines," cit., p. 0-611. 
than simply a "problem." Hence the decisionmaker must be persuaded to 
accept some limitations on his freedom of choice on the basis of something less 
than a full proof.'l 
Perhaps we can see now why the long-drawn debate whether ASA is descrip- 
tive ( l ~ k e  "pure science") o r  prescriptive (like technology) has been so fruitless. 
ASA is concerned with theorizmg, choosing, and acting. Hence, its character is 
three-fold: descriptive (scientific), prescriptive (advisory), and persuasive 
(argumentative-interactive). In fact, if we look a t  the fine structure of analytic 
arguments we see a complex blend of factual statements, methodological 
choices, evaluations, recommendations, and persuasive definitions and commun- 
ications. An even more complex structure emerges when we look a t  the interac- 
tions talnng place between analysts and different audiences of sponsors, policy 
makers, evaluators, and interested publics. Moreover, descriptive propositions, 
prescriptions, and persuasion are  intertwined in a way that  rules out the possi- 
bility of applying a unique set  of evaluative criteria, let alone proving or refuting 
an argument conclusively. As I have tried to show, the historical pattern of 
development of ASA can be interpreted as the progressive realization of the 
complexity of the language of policy advice, and the slow evolution of appropri- 
ate forms of criticism. 
"For a more detailed argument and some examples, see Giandornenico Majone, "The Feasibility 
of Social Policies," Policy Sciences, vol. 6, 1875, pp.49-68. 
